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Background and summary
It is well known that every simple game can be represented as the intersection of weighted majority games. It, nevertheless, becomes of interest to ask how e ciently this can be done for a given simple game. The question of e ciency leads to the deÿnition of dimension. A simple game is said to be of dimension k if and only if it can be represented as the intersection of exactly k-weighted majority games, but not as the intersection of (k − 1)-weighted majority games. Notice, for example, that a simple game is of dimension 1 if and only if it is weighted. It is well known that the dimension of a game is at most the number of maximal losing coalitions, although a representation of this kind tends to be enormously ine cient. For example, consider the United States federal system as a simple game in which there are 537 players. The order of magnitude of maximal losing coalitions is 10 130 and, consequently, it would require about 10 130 weighted majority games to represent it.
In this paper we will study the dimension of two types of simple games, each of which is a particular case of the compound simple games introduced by Shapley [4] . For the games that we will consider, each player belongs to one of the m chambers. The bill is previously accepted or refused in each one of the chambers and ÿnally a rule of global decision (which includes all the possible results for the chambers) is applied.
Our main focus is in ÿnding the dimension of a game that uses unanimity in each one of the chambers, while the global decision is an individualist game played by all the chambers. In this case, we will say that the game is a composition of unanimity games via individualism. This result provides a much better way to achieve exponential dimension (in a monotonic setting) than Taylor and Zwicker's use [7] of a particular dual game for the special case where all chambers have two voters. We also extend their result by giving a constructive procedure to achieve the dimension.
An interesting interpretation of those two types of simple games is found in the ÿelds of Reliability Systems and Circuits Theory (see, for example, [3] ) in which threshold functions and the additive systems correspond to weighted majority games. To see this, it is necessary to consider the components of the system as players and the subsets of components as coalitions of players. From this point of view, the games presented here correspond, respectively, to parallel-series and series-parallel systems or parallel-series and series-parallel circuits.
A (monotonic) simple game is a pair (N; v) where N = {1; 2; : : : ; n} is called the set of players or voters. Every S ⊆ N is a coalition, C(N ) is the set of all coalitions, v : C(N ) → {0; 1}; v(∅) = 0 is the characteristic function, which satisÿes v(N ) = 1 and v(S)6v(T ) if S ⊂ T . A coalition S is winning if v(S) = 1 and losing otherwise. The set of winning coalitions is denoted by W and the set of losing coalitions is denoted by L.
If each proper subcoalition of a winning coalition is losing, this winning coalition is called minimal. It should be noted that a monotonic simple game is completely determined by its minimal winning coalitions. The set of minimal winning coalitions is denoted by W m . If each proper super-coalition of a losing coalition is winning, this losing coalition is called maximal. The set of maximal losing coalitions is denoted by where, for each coalition S ⊆ N , w(S) = i∈S w i . The number q is called the quota and w i the weight of player i.
The following notion was introduced for graphs in the late 1970s; its extension to hypergraphs (simple games not necessarily monotonic) is due to Jereslow [2] . Nevertheless, the deÿnition of dimension for a simple game is reminiscent of the dimension [1] of a partially ordered set as the minimum number of linear orders whose intersection is the given partial ordering.
The dimension of (N; W) is the least k such that there exists weighted majority games (N; W 1 ); : : : ; (N; W k ) such that
In fact, W is the intersection of k nonnegatively WMGs. (since the games considered here are monotonic), and cannot be written as the intersection of k − 1 WMGs. The interest in the last deÿnition, however, stems from the following (see, for example, [6] ).
Theorem 1.1. Every simple game has a dimension and this is bounded by the number of maximal losing coalitions.
Most naturally occurring simple games in use are modeled by simple games of dimension 1 or 2. Interesting examples of dimension 2 are the United States federal system and the procedure to amend the Canadian Constitution, see [6] . In the books of Taylor [5] and Taylor and Zwicker [7] , the authors deal with dimension theory for simple games.
Dimension of composition of unanimity games via individualism
In this section, we will determine the dimension of games whose set of players N = {1; : : : ; n} admits a partition N 1 ; : : : ; N m in such a way that
In this kind of game, passage requires at least all of the votes in one of the chambers N i (i = 1; : : : ; m). From now on, the games deÿned in (1) will be called the composition of m unanimity games (N; u i ) via individualism. Notice that for this type of game, W m = {N 1 ; : : : ; N m }:
Let n i =|N i |; for i=1; : : : ; m, and suppose throughout this section that 16n 1 6 · · · 6n m . If m = 1 then N = N 1 and W m = {N } which is a WMG and admits the representation 
which is a weighted majority game (and, therefore, has dimension 1) and admits the representation ]:
From now on, we will exclude both cases. The set of maximal losing coalitions is
for all i = 1; : : : ; m}. Using Theorem 2.1 and the fact that |L M | = n 1 · : : : · n m ; we get that the dimension of (N; W) is at most n 1 · : : : · n m :
We will now see that if at least one of the chambers has more than one player, this result can be improved.
Theorem 2.1. Let (N; W) be a composition of m unanimity games (N i ; u i ) for i = 1; : : : ; m with 16n 1 6 · · · 6n m via individualism. Then the dimension of (N; W) is n 1 · : : : · n m−1 :
Proof. If m = 1 or n m−1 = 1 the game has dimension 1 as seen above. If n m−1 ¿ 1; Claims 1 and 3 below will show that (N; W) has the desired properties. Claim 2 is a combinatorial lemma required in the proof of Claim 3. Proof. For j = 1; : : : ; n 1 · : : : · n m−1 ; let (N; W j ) be the WMGs whose quota is q = n m and in each one of these distinct games there is a unique player in every class N i (i = 1; : : : ; m − 1); whose weight coincides with the quota q; the remaining players belonging to these classes have weight 0. Let all the players that belong to N m have weight 1. Now we must show that W = n1·:::·nm−1 j=1 W j :
(⊆) It will be enough to prove this inclusion for minimal winning coalitions. Assume ÿrst that S = N i (i = 1; : : : ; m − 1). Then N i ∈ W j for all j = 1; : : : ; n 1 · : : : · n m−1 because in each one of the games (N; W j ) there is a unique winning player in N i . Second, as every player in N m has weight 1 in each game (N; W j ); the total weight of N m equals with the quota in every game (N; W j ).
(⊇) Suppose that S ∈ W: It will su ce to show that if S ∈ L M ; then |S ∩N i |=n i −1 for every i = 1; : : : ; m: Let k i be the unique element in N i − S for every i = 1; : : : ; m. Then S is a losing coalition in the WMG deÿned as follows: q = n m for every k i ∈ N i − S; i = 1; : : : ; m − 1; weight 1 for players in N m and weight 0 otherwise. Proof. Let R 1 ; : : : ; R 1+nm be distinct maximal losing coalitions of (N; W). Consider R 1 and R 2 . If these coalitions do not accomplish the enunciated property, then there exists 16p6m such that
Now, the set
and |A p R1 | = n p . Since 1 + n m ¿ n p there exists at least one coalition R l ; l = 3; : : : ; 1 + n m such that R l ∈ A p R1 and, either R l ∩ N p = R 1 ∩ N p or R l ∩ N p = R 2 ∩ N p :
the enunciated property follows, i.e.,
∃ j ∈ T − R; j ∈ N q ; p = q:
is not the intersection of n 1 · : : : · n m−1 − 1 WMGs.
Proof. Assume, for contradiction, that W is the intersection of n 1 ·: : :·n m−1 −1; WMGs (N; W j ). Since |L M | = n 1 · : : : · n m and n 1 · : : : · n m n 1 · : : : · n m−1 − 1 ¿ n m by a generalization of the pigeon-hole principle, there would be at least 1+n m maximal losing coalitions in the same WMG (N; W k ). Consider these 1 + n m maximal losing coalitions. By Claim 2, it is always possible to ÿnd coalitions R; T such that
From here, we observe that 
If we compare the weights from both coalitions in the same game (N; W k ) we have w k j ¡ w k i . Both inequalities contradict the fact that (N; W k ) is a WMG Theorem 2.1 provides a better way to achieve exponential dimension (in a monotonic setting) than that of Taylor and Zwicker [7] . In particular, let (N; W) be a composition of m unanimity games with k = n 1 = · · · = n m via individualism. Then the dimension of (N; W) is k m−1 .
If one has a game of dimension q and realizes it as intersection of q WMGs, then intersecting any p6q of these yields a game of exact dimension p. Using this fact and Theorem 2.1, one can obtain games of every dimension with a reduced number of players. Table 1 , based on Theorem 2.1, shows for small dimension p upper bounds for the minimum number n of players required to get a game of dimension p. As a parallel-series system (in terms of Reliability theory) its schematic diagram is given in Fig. 1 .
Applying the result obtained in Theorem 2.1, the dimension of this game is 4 and a representation of the game as the intersection of 4 WMGs is 
A concluding remark: the dual case
If a game with player set N = {1; : : : ; n} admits a partition N 1 ; : : : ; N m in such a way that W = {S ⊆ N : |S ∩ N i |¿1; for all i = 1; : : : ; m};
(
we shall say that this game is a composition of m individualist games via unanimity. Let n i = |N i | (i = 1; : : : ; m); and suppose throughout this section that 16n 1 6 · · · 6n m . We notice that if n m = 1; then m = n so we obtain the unanimity game, in which case the unique winning coalition is the grand coalition N . This game is a weighted majority game, and therefore its dimension is 1. In the following, we will exclude this case.
In this kind of game passage requires a total of at least m of the n possible votes, subject to the proviso that at least one vote is obtained from each chamber N i (i = 1; : : : ; m). It can also be interpreted as a particular case of compound games, introduced by Shapley [4] , v[u 1 ; : : : ; u m ]; where v : {1; : : : ; m} → {0; 1} denotes the unanimity game played in the m chambers and each one of u i : N i → {0; 1} (i = 1; : : : ; m) is an individualist's game. Taylor and Zwicker [7] did the calculation of the dimension for the special case where all the chambers have two voters and we point out:
(a) the calculation done by them trivially generalizes if all the chambers have at least two voters, and (b) adding a veto player does not change dimension. This is known for dimension 1, and the point is that chambers of size 1 can be realized by adding dummy players and then giving them veto power.
Speciÿcally, the generalization of their result is: Let (N; W) be a composition of m individualist games (N i ; u i ) (i = 1; : : : ; m) with 16n 1 6 · · · 6n m via unanimity and let p ¡ m such that either n p = 1; n p+1 ¿ 1 or p = 0 if n 1 ¿ 1. Then the dimension of (N; W) is m − p. It is straightforward to check that one way to express (N; W) as the intersection of m − p WMGs, W j ; is (N; W 1 ) ≡ [q 1 ; w 1 1 ; : : : ; w 1 n ] where ; then, n 1 = n 2 = 1; n 3 = n 4 = 2; n 5 = 3: As a series-parallel system (in terms of Reliability theory) its schematic diagram is given in Fig. 2 .
Using the extended results of Taylor and Zwicker we have that the dimension of (N; W) is m − p = 5 − 2 = 3; and one of the representations for the game as the intersection of WMGs is W = [5; 2; 2; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0] ∩ [1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0] ∩ [1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1]:
It is interesting to note that in the games that are compositions of m individualist games (N; u i ) (i = 1; : : : ; m) via unanimity, the usual description of the game, by means of minimal winning coalitions, requires n 1 · : : : · n m coalitions (with n i = |N i |) and each one of them has m players, i.e., m · n 1 · : : : · n m digits are needed to describe the game. Using intersections of WMGs, (n+1)·(m−p) digits are required to describe the game. This latter number is generally much smaller than the former, and so, the description of the game is much shorter.
As an example, consider a 30-person game of the type described with n 1 =n 2 =n 3 =10. In this case, the game has 1000 minimal winning coalitions each of which has 3 players. Using minimal winning coalitions, 3000 digits would be required to deÿne the game. On the other hand, as the dimension of the game is 3, we would then require only 93 digits to describe the game as an intersection of 3 WMGs.
